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Abstract
The reasoned action approach, although ubiquitous in health behavior theory (e.g., Theory of Reasoned Action/Planned
Behavior), does not adequately address two key dynamical aspects of health behavior: learning and the effect of immediate
social context (i.e., social influence). To remedy this, we put forth a computational implementation of the Theory of
Reasoned Action (TRA) using artificial-neural networks. Our model re-conceptualized behavioral intention as arising from a
dynamic constraint satisfaction mechanism among a set of beliefs. In two simulations, we show that constraint satisfaction
can simultaneously incorporate the effects of past experience (via learning) with the effects of immediate social context to
yield behavioral intention, i.e., intention is dynamically constructed from both an individual’s pre-existing belief structure
and the beliefs of others in the individual’s social context. In a third simulation, we illustrate the predictive ability of the
model with respect to empirically derived behavioral intention. As the first known computational model of health behavior,
it represents a significant advance in theory towards understanding the dynamics of health behavior. Furthermore, our
approach may inform the development of population-level agent-based models of health behavior that aim to incorporate
psychological theory into models of population dynamics.
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Introduction
Some of the most successful models of individuals’ health
behavior are variants of the reasoned action approach. This
success is due to: a moderate degree of variance in behavior can be
accounted for by its constructs [1,2,3]; it applies across several key
health behaviors to include drinking [4], exercise [5], substance
use [6], health screening [7], and sexual risk [8]; and, interventions
that change its constructs can, in fact, generate change in
behaviors (see [9] for a review).
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) [10] is the embodiment
of the reasoned action approach (also see the Theory of Planned
Behavior [11], and the Integrated Model, [12]). Here, behaviors
are driven directly by intentions towards a behavior. Intentions are
driven directly by attitudes and perceived norms related to the
behavior. Attitudes and perceived norms are formed from beliefs.
For example, an attitude towards performing a behavior is
represented in the equation below, where (b) is belief strength (the
subjective probability that the outcome of a behavior will come
true), (e) is an evaluation of the outcome associated with the






Beliefs have a special status in that they are foundational in
forming attitudes and perceived norms and are the only inroad to
changing attitudes, perceived norms and, ultimately, intention
[13].
Although the TRA was not designed to capture changes in
beliefs, research on the application of the TRA has provided
evidence that beliefs can change in systematic ways (e.g., the
desirability of an outcome related to a behavior), which can, in
turn, change attitudes and intention [14]. In short, the TRA
provides a psychologically grounded model of the belief –
intention link, but without much theoretical attention to how
beliefs are formed or changed, except to say that intentions and
attitudes can change through changes in beliefs. Thus, the TRA
remains a relatively static theory of health behavior and behavioral
change.
A completely different approach to understanding health
behavior comes from the field of social networks. This work posits
that the health behavior of individuals is dynamic and sensitive to
social context. In short, people affect others’ behavior. This idea is
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well supported empirically [15,16] and is implicated in several
areas of health behavior, e.g.: smoking cessation [17], mental
health [18], emotions [19], suicidal ideation [20], drug use [21],
and obesity [22]. The social network literature, however, does not
address the possible psychological mechanisms involved in the
spreading of behavior across social network ties.
In this article, we put forth an extension of the TRA that can
accommodate the dynamic nature of health behaviors suggested by
the social networks literature and that is also captured, to some
extent, by the evidence of intention change in the TRA. To this end,
we turn to methods and theory from both personality theory and the
more recent literature on attitudes for which there is substantial
work on the dynamics of attitude formation and change.
The recent advances in the basic theory of attitude formation
and change have integrated theory from cognitive science into a
dynamic theory of attitude representation and process [23,24].
This work, using a computational theory called constraint
satisfaction, conceptualizes an attitude as a distributed memory
representation across a set of interconnected beliefs (constraint
satisfaction is described in detail below). By this account, an
attitude is a state in a dynamic system that is reconstructed from a
set of inputs. The inputs, which represent the immediate social
context, can activate beliefs in memory. The interconnections
between beliefs represent more long-term attitude structure–these
are learned slowly though exposure to many social contexts over
time. Personality theory has addressed a similar set of issues, using
constraint satisfaction, relating to how one’s behavior is influenced
by social contexts and situations [25,26,27,28]. Here, behavior is
considered in tandem with a person’s situational context. To
explain behavior one must know not only the structure of the
personality but also the contexts in which behavior operates.
From these two related literatures, the major import for health
behavior is that attitudes and behavior are at once context-
sensitive (based on the cues and inputs in the environment) and
stable (due to the learned interconnections among the beliefs and
cognitions in the system). This, to our mind, fills in the theoretical
lacuna with respect to the dynamics of health behavior.
The model of the TRA we put forth here is directly concerned
with understanding the dynamics of intention formation and
change. Our model affords intention formation and change that is
at once sensitive to the immediate context and also stable across a
set of similar contexts–i.e., intention is dynamically constructed
from an individual’s learned pre-existing belief structure and the
beliefs of others in the individual’s social context Specifically, our
model considers intention as a distributed memory representation
across a set of beliefs. To borrow from Conrey and Smith [23]:
Intention is a state, not a thing.
The Theory of Reasoned Action as Parallel Constraint
Satisfaction
We’ve re-conceptualized the Theory of Reasoned Action as a
parallel constraint satisfaction system. In the abstract, this type of
system represents generic psychological constructs (e.g., features,
beliefs, thoughts, units of memory) as set of processing units each
of which can vary in its activation level. Each unit represents a
hypothesis about whether or not, or how strongly, a psychological
construct is activated. Constraint satisfaction refers, in part, to the
fact that each unit’s activation level is constrained by the activation
levels of other units. For example, if unit X is expected to be active
when unit Y is active, the connection between them should be
excitatory. In the same way, if the constraint is such that unit X is
not expected to be active when unit Y is active, then there should
be an inhibitory connection between them. With no expectation,
the connection should be neutral, which effectively means there is
no constraint between units X and Y. External inputs to the system
(e.g., a social situation or context) have similar effects. If a relevant
feature is present in the external input, it will constrain a unit’s
activation to be on. In general, for each new input to the system, a
constraint satisfaction network settles into a state–via a relaxation
procedure–in which the constraints are well satisfied, at a local
level. This mechanism has proven successful in both cognitive
science and personality and social psychology [29,30].
Figure 1 illustrates our re-conceptualization of the TRA. In our
model, beliefs are the constituents of what we call the intention
system. To capture valence, each belief is split between two units;
one represents positive valence (to intend) and the other represents
negative valence (to not intend); there is an inhibitory connection
between them, i.e., each valence of a belief constrains the other
valence of the same belief to be less active.
Intention, in TRA parlance, is represented by the pattern of
activation across the belief units. It is useful to organize the pattern
of activation as two separate banks of intention units as depicted in
Figure 1; the intend bank represents intending to do the behavior
in question (positive valences of the beliefs, in red), the not intend
bank represents not intending to do the behavior (the negative
valences, in gray). Thus, at any point in time, the intention of the
system is roughly in one of three states: intend (on average the
intend bank is more active), not intend (the compliment of intend),
ambivalent (where both banks are nearly equally active).
By design, the constraints among beliefs are not pre-specified
because there is no a priori reason to do so. These constraints
capture what is learned by the system about health behavior from
past social contexts or situations through modification of the
strength and sign (inhibitory or excitatory) of the constraints. We
call these internal processing constraints to capture the idea that what is
learned represents the stable internal psychological structure of a
person–a pre-existing belief structure for any social context that is
encountered. We assume learning about health behavior occurs
over the long-term from exposure to social contexts such as
cultural sources, media outlets, family, and friends.
An external input to the system represents constraints on the
units from the immediate social context–i.e. others’ beliefs activate
the belief units in the system. Inputs are dictated to follow the same
valence structure that is present in the model. Thus, if the input
showed evidence that the positive valence of Belief 1 was active in
the social context, the input would constrain the positive valence to
be active and provide no constraint on the negative valence of
Belief 1. We call these external processing constraints to capture the
idea that the immediate, short-term social context can constrain
the activation levels of the system at any time-point. Furthermore,
the degree to which the external inputs constrain the units is
controlled by a clamping factor. Conceptually, clamping repre-
sents the weight a person gives to others’ beliefs–stronger clamping
reflects more weight to others’ beliefs.
The external inputs to the system play a role in both the
learning of internal processing constraints and the immediate
external constraints on the system. As we will explain below,
learning is not always ‘‘on’’ in the system. When it is ‘‘off’’ the
external constraints only play a role in the relaxation procedure to
determine the current state of the system; when ‘‘on’’ the external
constraints have the additional function of potentially leading to a
modification of the internal processing constraints.
Conceptual Overview of System Simulations
The general design of our simulations was to first generate a set
of internal constraints (via learning) for a specific, definable context
and then to test how the model behaved when embedded in
several equally specific and definable external contexts (defined by
Reasoned Action as Constraint Satisfaction
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Figure 1. The Theory of Reasoned Action as a constraint satisfaction system. Each belief is split among two processing units; one to
capture positive valence (red circles) and the other to capture negative valence (grey circles). The numbers within each unit index the belief (1 = belief
one…14=belief fourteen). Inter-bank connections: The constraint between valence units within a belief is always inhibitory (see the blue connecting
lines between units). There are no constraints between units that are both a different belief and different valence. Intra-bank connections: Within each
valence bank, the beliefs are fully connected (i.e., each belief can constrain all other beliefs of the same valence (see the curved green arrows next to
each valence bank). These constraints, called internal processing constraints, are modifiable, through learning, from a set of input patterns which
represent past social context/situations regarding others’ beliefs. Dynamics: External input to the system (not shown here) directly activates the belief
units and represents others’ beliefs (called external processing constraints). The state of the system at any time point is a function of both the internal
and external processing constraints; a constraint satisfaction algorithm dictates the specific form of this function.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062490.g001
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a set of input patterns). The degree to which (strength of) the
external context impinged on the system (the clamping factor) was
systematically varied within the simulations.
In the first two simulations, the design attempted to pit learned
aspects of behavioral intention against both the nature of and
strength of the immediate social context with respect to the same
behavioral intention. The nature of short-term social contexts is an
analog for exposure to what other beliefs people hold; clamp
strength is an analog for how much influence or weight a person
gives to the short term context.
In the third simulation, the design attempted to show that our
conceptualization of intention, as a pattern of activation in the
system, actually mapped onto empirical measures of intention.




The human subjects data was collected under approval from the
Institutional Review Board of the University of Washington.
Written informed consent was obtained from all parents of the
participants (all were students in school) prior to Year I and Year
IV of the study. Furthermore, written assent was obtained from all
participants every year of the study. The data used in this
manuscript was striped of all identifying information and we did
not have any access to the coding scheme between the de-
identified data and the larger dataset. Thus, there was no potential
way for us to link the individual data points in the data we used
with the actual participants.
Participants & Measures
We used self-report survey data specifically designed to measure
the TRA with respect to sexual behavior in adolescents to
construct a portion of the inputs for our simulations. These data
were part of a seven year longitudinal in-school survey from 1992
to 1998 [31]. The survey sampling methods, demographics, and
questionnaire are described in the online Supporting Information
(see File S1).
The TRA measures were included in year six of the survey
(N= 749, 10th–12th grades); we used the outcome and normative
belief measures for all simulations. The outcome beliefs captured
the following concepts (framed by the question ‘‘Do you think
having sexual intercourse will make you…’’): feel good, be more
popular, feel loved, feel experienced, get an STD, get pregnant,
regret it later, get HIV, and have emotional stress. These beliefs
were defined as the product of the likelihood of occurrence of the
outcome (from 1 to 4 where large means more likely) and the
evaluation of the outcome if it occurred. The evaluative
component captured the valence of the belief (ranging from
22= very bad, 2= very good, with a zero midpoint representing
neutral). Normative beliefs were defined as the product of the
respondent’s perception of a referent’s attitude towards he/she
having sexual intercourse and the respondent’s motivation to
comply with said referent (the latter ranged from 1 to 4 where
large means more likely to comply). The referents were parents,
best friend, other friends, favorite teacher, closest sibling. The
valence of normative beliefs was captured by the referent’s
attitude, ranging from 22= referent does not think its ok for
respondent to have sex to 2= referent thinks its ok (with a zero
midpoint). Thus, the resultant 14 beliefs (nine outcome and five
normative) were measured on an integer scale from 28 to 8
(including a zero mid-point); negative indicated negative valence,
positive indicated positive valence; magnitude was captured by the
absolute value of the scale. See the online Supporting Information
(File S1) for details on and examples of these measures.
In one of the simulations (Simulation III) we also used a direct
measure of intention (Empirical Intention): ‘‘When you are in
[next grade], do you think you will have sexual intercourse?’’
[1 =NO!, 2 = no, 3= yes, 4 =YES!].
We isolated the following sub-populations of the sample based
on gender, school grade (10th or 12th), and virginity status (virgin
or not virgin): Female, 10th grade, virgin, N=105; female, 12th
grade, virgin, N= 66; and female, 12th grade, not virgin, N=73.
Model Specification
Figure 1 represents the general structure of our model–fourteen
beliefs separated into 28 units. This is an auto-associator neural
network [32]. Not shown in Figure 1 is the existence of two
separate banks of ten hidden units each of which were fully
projected to and from the respective intention bank (i.e., bi-
directional connections to the respective bank). Units were never
self-connected; all were connected to a bias unit. The belief units
functioned as both input and output units. We implemented a
modified logistic activation function across all units. For every
input to the system, the units were updated synchronously for nine
cycles. A small portion of activation values at the end of each
processing cycle for every input pattern was carried over to the
initial input for the next input pattern. Activation of the units in
the model were restricted to (0, 1).
Nature of input patterns. The input patterns used both to
generate the internal constraints and to run simulations were of
identical structure. The input patterns consisted of a binary vector
of length 14 and its bitwise compliment (total length is 28). The
first 14 bits on the vector represented the inputs to the intend
bank; the others represented the not intend bank.
We constructed six types of input sets. Set P25, was defined by a
set of input patterns that, on average, had a probability of.25 for
representing the positive valence of each belief (independently for
each belief). This set was designed to represent the context in
which there was a relatively strong inclination for not intending to
do the health behavior. To represent the contexts of a neutral and
a strong inclination for intending to do the health behavior, we
constructed Set P50 and Set P75–defined exactly as P25, but
with.50 and.75 probabilities in place of.25.
The other three sets were derived from the empirical dataset
described under Participants. Sets F10V (Female, 10th Grade,
Virgins), F12V (Female, 12th Grade Virgins), and F12NV (Female,
12th Grade Non-Virgins) were transformed from the empirical
data on its original scale to fit the structure of the model in a way
that preserved the belief valence structure. The original scale for
both outcome and normative beliefs was from28 to 8, including a
midpoint of zero. We transformed this scale in two steps at the
individual participant level. First, we transformed the original scale
to a binary scale by assigning negative values to 0, positive to 1 and
zero probabilistically to 0 or 1 (with a probability of.5 to assign as
1). Then we defined the negative valence of the input structure as
the logical compliment to the positive valence. In short, we
mapped the original scale onto the positive/negative valence
structure of the input pattern in a way that preserved the original
valence but not magnitude of the scale. Each participant was
represented as a single example in her respective input set.
Generation of internal processing constraints. The
internal processing constraints were of two kinds: 1) the connection
weights between intra-belief valences, and 2) the connection
weights between the belief units within each valence bank. The
former were fixed at 2.20 to provide an inhibitory constraint
between valences within each belief. For the latter, we generated
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two sets of internal constraints. The first, using the P25 input set,
represented the case in which the model learned from contexts
with a strong bias for not intending to do the health behavior
(called the P25 weight set). The second, using the F10V input set,
was a context in which the model learned the belief structure of
Female, 10th grade virgins (called the F10V weight set).
To train the connection weights for a given set of input patterns,
we trained the system in batch mode for 200 epochs using the
generalized delta-rule. Within each epoch, the error was computed
for the 7–9th processing cycle of each input pattern. Clamp
strength was fixed at 0.50 (the connection weight from each
external input to the system units). We used a single input set of 50
input patterns to generate the connection weights for the P25
weight set. For the F10V weight set, we trained the model using
the full data set for female, 10th grade virgins (N= 105).
Structure of the empirical input sets. Figure 2 represents
the F10V, F12V and F12NV input sets separately, showing the
proportion of respondents that had a positive and negative valence
for each of the 14 TRA constructs. By considering these
proportions as frequencies in the input to the system, we can
understand to a rough approximation what the system learned
when exposed to the F10V input set. In particular it learned: 1)
inhibitory constraints between constructs where one is frequent
and the other is not, 2) excitatory constraints between constructs
where both are frequent, and 3) no constraint between constructs
that are both infrequent. For, example, it should learn an
inhibitory constraint between the ‘‘feel good’’ construct and the
‘‘get an STD’’ construct in the intend bank of units in the system.
At a more aggregate level, we can understand what the system
learned by illustrating the average exposure to valence from the
inputs. The mean valence, across beliefs, was 0.29 positive for the
F10V input set–it leaned heavily towards the negative valence (to
not intend). For comparison, this statistic was 0.36 and 0.42 for the
F12V and F12NV input sets, respectively, indicating an increase in
positive beliefs about sexual behavior from 10th to 12th grade and
between 12th grade virgins and non-virgins.
We describe the structure of the input sets in Figure 2 as a way
to understand what might be learned by the neural network
model. An alternative way to understand this would be to analyze
the connection weight matrix directly. Without hidden units, the
weight structure would be relatively straight-forward to analyze.
However, due to the number of hidden units in our model, such an
analysis would not be fruitful.
Nature of external constraints during simula-
tions. External constraints were the input patterns presented
to the system during the simulation phase (always after the internal
constraints were generated; learning was not allowed during
simulation). For Simulations I and II, the input patterns were
scaled by the clamping factor (2-levels,.10 and.50, called weak and
strong clamping conditions, respectively). For Simulation III, only
the strong clamping condition was used.
Simulations
Simulation I. This simulation used the P25 weight set
simulated under input sets P25, P50 and P75 (separately, for a
set of three input conditions). The clamping factor was varied
across the two levels describe above. In short, keeping the internal
constraints constant at P25, Simulation I used a 3 (input set) X 2
(clamping factor) factorial design.
Simulation II. This simulation used the F10V weight set
simulated under input sets F10V, F12V, F12NV, P50 and P75.
The clamping factor was varied as in Simulation I, thus this was a
5 (input set) X 2 (clamping factor) factorial design.
Simulation method for I and II. For each condition in the
simulations, 30 runs were conducted (a run is analogous to an
individual person in an experimental setting). Each run consisted
of ten epochs of the same 50 input patterns (totaling 500 exposures
to inputs). The input patterns across runs were different. Data was
collected on the 9th processing cycle for each input pattern (500
data points per run/per condition). Learning was blocked during
all simulations.
The input patterns across runs were different for each
simulation within a condition. For Simulation I, this was
accomplished by simply generating a random set of 50 inputs
for each run. For Simulation II, this was accomplished by
sampling 50 times (without replacement) from the appropriate
input set to create the input patters for each run. For example, for
run #1 under the F12V input condition, we sampled the 66
respondents in the empirical sample of Female, 12th grade virgins
50 times without replacement to generate the input patterns for
this run.
Simulation III. This simulation was different in nature
compared to Simulations I and II. The F10V weight set was
simulated under the F10V input set, as in simulation II, with a
clamping factor of 0.50. However, the simulation consisted of only
one run and one epoch per run. That is, we presented the system
with 105 separate input patterns only once. Each of the 105 input
patterns represented one of the 105 respondents in the F10V
subset of the empirical data. Data was collected on the 9th
processing cycle for each input pattern, resulting in 105 data points
for the simulation, each of which represented the intention formed
given the input. As in Simulations I and II, learning was blocked
during the simulation.
Results and Discussion
For each simulation condition in Simulation I and II we present
the mean activation of the positive and negative valence banks
across the 500 input patterns and 30 runs per condition (1500 data
points per mean).
Simulation I
Figure 3 shows the mean activation for each valence bank. The
green dashed-horizontal lines on the y-axis demarcate mean
activation levels of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 to capture the predicted
mean activation values of the valence banks, given that the
external constraints dominated the behavior of the system–e.g., for
the P25 condition the mean activations should be around 0.25 and
0.75 for the intend and not intend banks, respectively, if the
external constraints dominate; for the P50, 0.50 for both banks; for
the P75 condition, the reverse of the P25 condition. Thus, the
difference between the dashed horizontal lines and the model
output illustrates the extent to which the internal constraints
affected the state of the intention system.
Figure 3a shows the results for Simulation I under strong
external clamping. For the P25 input set, the mean activations of
the intend and not intend banks approximated what was predicted
if the external constraints were driving the system. Under this
condition, the input patterns were highly similar to those used to
generate the internal constraints (i.e., the system learned from
contexts that strongly favored not intending). Thus, it is difficult to
infer the extent to which the system behavior was driven by either
the internal or external constraints; the P50 and P75 input sets
provided a better test. For these two conditions, the mean bank
activations closely matched what would be expected if the internal
constraints had a minimal effect on system behavior. In short,
under strong external clamping the external constraints (i.e., the
Reasoned Action as Constraint Satisfaction
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short-term social context representing others’ beliefs) dominated
the behavior of the intention system.
Figure 3b shows the weak clamping condition. The P25 input
set shows that, even under weak clamping, the inputs still had a
strong effect on the system. However, the P50 condition indicates
that the internal constraints also had an effect on system behavior.
The lower activation for the intend bank compared to the not
intend bank mapped onto the bias of negative valence (not intend)
inherent in the internal constraints. The P75 condition provides
further support that the internal constraints played a role in system
behavior. Although the intend bank was much more activated
Figure 2. The valence structure in the empirical input sets used to generate the internal processing constraints for Simulation II.
Each horizontal line represents the proportion of respondents (in the respective input set) that had a positive or negative valence (the proportion
negative is, by definition, 1 minus the proportion positive). Black represents the F10V input set; red and green, F12V and F12NV, respectively. The
proportion positive is captured from the zero-midpoint on the x-axis towards the left (see the dotted black vertical line); negative is to the right.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062490.g002
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than the not intend bank, its activation was much less than the not
intend bank in the P25 condition.
In sum, Simulation I suggests that both the internal and external
constraints can constrain system behavior– the internal constraints
do so only with weak clamping. That is, both the pre-existing
learned belief structure and others’ beliefs in the immediate social
context were implicated in intention formation.
Simulation II
Simulation I demonstrated that the system behavior was
sensitive to both the internal and external constraints (i.e., learned
aspects and short-term social context, respectively). In Simulation
II, we tested our theoretical model in a more realistic context.
Figure 4 has the same structure as Figure 3. For the strong
clamping condition, it is clear that the F10V input set strongly
activated the system. This was expected because the F10V input
set was used to generate the internal constraints. The F12V and
F12NV input sets exhibited an increase in the activation of the
intend bank and a parallel decrease in the not intend bank,
attributable to the increase in positive valance represented in these
input sets. Thus, the system was sensitive to the external
constraints. However, these input sets do not provide much
insight into the degree to which the internal constraints affected
behavior. To this end, we presented the P50 and P75 input sets to
the system. The P50 input set shows that the system was sensitive
to both the internal and external constraints. Both banks were
activated less than expected (0.50) and the intend bank was
Figure 3. The results from Simulation I. The x-axis shows the three input set conditions: P25, P50, and P75. The y-axis represents the mean
activation of each valence bank (red= positive, to intend; grey = negative, to not intend). The green dashed-horizontal lines indicate mean activation
levels of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75. The error bars show the standard deviation across 30 runs of each input set X clamping factor condition (using n= 30 in
the denominator). Panel A shows the strong clamping condition; Panel B shows weak clamping.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062490.g003
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activated less than the not intend bank (capturing the bias inherent
in the learned internal constraints). The P75 input set further
supports the findings from the P50 condition. The intend bank was
much less activated than the expected value of 0.75. In short,
under strong clamping, the system showed sensitivity to both the
internal and external constraints. This contrasts with the results of
Simulation I in which under strong clamping the system did not
show much sensitivity to the internal constraints.
The results under weak clamping generally echoed those under
strong clamping; the internal and external constraints both played
a role in system behavior. However, this condition revealed a
further property of the system. The P50 condition showed weaker
activation of the intend bank compared to the F10V condition.
This suggests that there may have been competition among the
units in the intend bank (inhibitory and excitatory constraints
cancel out one another), which accords with the structure of the
inputs that generated the internal constraints (See Figure 2).
Figure 2 illustrates that there should be more inhibitory
connections among the units in the intend bank compared to
the not intend bank. This was not the case for Simulation I
because there was not as much inherent structure in the inputs.
The comparison between the weak and strong clamping condi-
tions reveals a related point. When comparing the weak to strong
clamping, most of the change in activation is exhibited from an
increase in the intend bank activation. This may also stem from
competition among the units in the intend bank.
Simulation III
Simulation III was designed to test how well the model could
predict intention in the empirical data set, using the F10V weights
Figure 4. The results from Simulation II. The x-axis shows the three input set conditions: F10V, F12V, F12NV, P50, and P75. The y-axis represents
the mean activation of each valence bank (red=positive, to intend; grey =negative, to not intend). The green dashed-horizontal lines indicate mean
activation levels of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75. The error bars show the standard deviation across 30 runs of each input set X clamping factor condition (using
n= 30 in the denominator). Panel A shows the strong clamping condition; Panel B shows weak clamping.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062490.g004
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and input set. In short, the simulation produced an intention score
(called Model Intention) for each of the 105 female 10th grade
virgins in the F10V input set. These were compared directly to the
empirical measure of intention, called Empirical Intention
(described under Participants & Measures). In short, this provides
a way to compare intention as defined in the model with intention
as defined in the Theory of Reasoned Action.
The data for this simulation was not aggregated as in Simulation
I and II. For each of the 105 input patterns tested in Simulation
III, we computed an intention score equal to the mean of the
intend bank minus the mean of the not intend bank. The intention
score had a theoretical range from negative one to one and was
continuous in nature; negative values represented not intend;
positive values, intend. This measure was characterized statistically
as follows: M=20.413, SD=0.181, range= (20.924, 0.086).
From this measure, we constructed a four-level categorical variable
of intention, called Model Intention, using the following cut-points:
(21, 20.5] = 1, (20.5, 0] = 2, (0, 0.5] = 3, and (0.5 to 1) = 4. The
values of Model Intention were designed to be directly
equivalent to the same values of Empirical Intention such that
1 = (NO!), 2 = (no), 3 = (yes), 4 = (YES!).
Table 1 shows the cross-tabulation of Model Intention with
Empirical Intention. There was a reasonable correspondence
between Model and Empirical Intention. Using Fisher’s Exact
Test, the probability of sampling this cross-tabulation, given the
marginals, was equal to 0.0004355; in other words, there was a
significant relation between the two intention measures. Further-
more, Model Intention miss-matched most for the Empirical
Intention levels one and three. We conducted further analysis to test
whether slightly shifting the cut-points used to construct Model
Intention would improve the correspondence between the two
intention measures. This was not possible. Our analysis indicated
that there were 27 input patterns at Empirical Intention levels one
and two between a very narrow range of the model intention score
(in continuous form); specifically, between the values of 20.422 and
20.420. Among these input patterns, however, there was no cut-
point for constructing Model Intention that increased the corre-
spondence between Model and Empirical Intention.
Table 2 shows the mean value of the model intention score (the
continuous measure) for each of the four levels of Empirical
Intention. Table 3 shows the model intention score (continuous)
regressed onto Empirical Intention. Taken together, these two
tables suggest a positive linear relation between the model
intention score and Empirical Intention.
Conclusions
The main findings of our modeling effort were twofold: First,
Simulations I and II showed that past experience biased the
behavior of the system towards an activation state that reflected
the internal processing constraints. This was qualified by both the
level of clamping (the stronger the clamp strength, the weaker the
effect of the internal processing bias) and the structure of the inputs
that defined the internal constraints (more structure in the internal
constraints results in stronger bias, e.g. Simulation II compared to
Simulation I). In terms of health behavior, this implies that the
immediate social context (others’ beliefs), although potentially
influential, may be systematically constrained by both the weight a
person gives to others’ beliefs (clamping) and a person’s pre-
existing belief structure (due to learning). This property embodies
the central notion of constraint satisfaction–simultaneous mitiga-
tion of constraints from multiple sources.
Second, the system’s intention state was predictive of the actual,
empirically measured intention scores, as shown in Simulation III.
This occurred despite the fact that the inputs for the simulation
only captured the valence structure and not the strength of the
beliefs (see above regarding how we transformed the empirical
data into inputs). And, we used a very simple algorithm to
construct Model Intention–subtract negative from positive valence
and cut into equally spaced quartiles. The explanation for this
predictive power is straightforward. The model learned to
represent well the inputs that were presented to it during the
simulation. (Remember, the inputs for training of the F10V weight
set were identical to the inputs used in Simulation III.) So, upon
presentation of an input, it captured well the belief structure
which, for the empirical data used in the simulation, correlated
with the empirical measurement of intention.
An Extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action
Is our model really an extension of the TRA? We argue yes for
three reasons. First, both our model and the TRA fall under the
rubric of the long-standing expectancy-value (EV) model (see [33]
for historical review)–in our model and in the TRA, intention is a
function the belief expectation (probability of an outcome of a
behavior) and the valuation (valence) across a set of beliefs.
Table 1. Crosstabulation of the categorical neural network
intention measure by the empiricial data set for the female
10th grade virgins (N = 105).
Intention Categories in Neural Network
Empirical Intention 1 2 3 4
1 (NO) 23 27 0 0
2 (no) 10 26 0 0
3 (yes) 0 17 1 0
4 (YES) 0 1 0 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062490.t001
Table 2. Mean value of model intention score (continuous)
for each level of Empirical Intention.
Empirical Intention Mean SE N
1 (NO) 20.50 0.02 50
2 (no) 20.39 0.03 36
3 (yes) 20.22 0.03 18
4 (YES) 20.29 – 1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062490.t002
Table 3. Regression of model intention score (continuous)
onto Empirical Intention (dummy-coded).
Empirical Intention* Coeff. SE p, x
Intercept 20.50 0.02 0.001
2 (no) 0.10 0.03 0.01
3 (yes) 0.27 0.04 0.001
4 (YES) 0.21 0.16 ns
Notes: *reference category was intention = 1 (NO); Adj. R-sq = 0.28; omnibus F
(3, 101) = 14.39, p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062490.t003
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Second, our model uses the same constructs and measures, but just
defines behavioral intention in a different way. Third, as an
extension, our model is simply a computational implementation of
the TRA. This is an accepted approach to theory development in
social psychology [34].
What is gained by virtue of a computational instantiation of the
TRA? The primary advance comes from the re-conceptualization
of intention. By our theory, intention is a state that arises from
constraint satisfaction–a highly non-linear process involving
internal and external processing constraints. Intention formation
is generated on the fly, dynamically, from the interaction between
current social situations and past learning. In other words,
dynamics are naturally situated into health behavior theory via
constraint satisfaction.
The second advance centers on learning. The TRA is silent with
respect to the explicit learning mechanisms that generate a
person’s belief structure. However, it is self-evident that both the
belief strength (the subjective probability that the belief will come
true) and the expectation of the outcome of the belief (the belief
valence) must be learned. By our theory, learning operates through
changes in the constraints among the beliefs and captures the
statistics of exposure to others’ beliefs. This implies that learning
captures the distribution of and the higher-order associations
among beliefs inherent in the past social experience. It is not clear
to what extent this contradicts the TRA because of the dearth of
work on learning with respect to it.
The third advance is that in our model the effects of past
experience on health behavior, via learning, are considered
separate from the effects of direct social influence–separate but
fully interdependent as dictated by the constraint satisfaction
mechanism. In contrast, although the exact mechanisms of
learning in the TRA are not clearly defined, there is no question
that beliefs, and thus intention, are meant to represent learning
from past experience alone; direct social influence has no role on
immediate behavior. In other related theory, however, there is
precedent to treat social influence separately from learning or
simply as the sole driver of behavior change. For example, the
social diffusion of health behavior is typically represented by a
influence coefficient [17,22] or a threshold rule [35]; learning is
not considered. In a similar vein, most agent-based models of
group norms do not incorporate learning, but capture the group
dynamics via social influence [36]. Recent work in personality
theory incorporates direct social influence as a primary driver of
behavior [28,37]. The current work casts health behavioral intention
as a function of both past-experience and direct social influence.
An important criterion for evaluating a new theoretical advance
is the extent to which it makes new, testable predictions.
Simulation III showed that our model could predict intention
under conditions in which the internal and external constraints
were closely aligned–i.e., the model’s past experience was very
similar to its current social context. However, what is the
prediction under other circumstances, especially those that are
crucial for health behavior applications? For example, in the
adolescent sexual behavior literature, key transition periods, such
as going from primary to secondary school, are very important.
How would the model predict intention as it evolves over key
developmental periods? Here, it is clear that the predictions for the
TRA and our model are different. If past experience and the
current social context are different, our model predicts that
intention will be a function of the two, via constraint satisfaction.
The TRA, however, does not make predictions that are based on
both past and current contexts and thus it does not make
predictions about such key developmental transitions beyond
suggesting that beliefs and thus intention will change over time.
In short, our model is capable of making specific predictions
that are based on the similarity of the current context and the past
social contexts–key constructs towards understanding develop-
mental transitions, and arguably other types of life-course changes
that might be related to health behavior (e.g., changes in contexts
that are generated by policy implementation). The central advance
in terms of testable predictions, then, is that our model points to
the need for understanding both the past and present social
contexts to predict changes in intention. This prediction is
amenable to experimental procedures or some type of prospective
observational studies that have a relatively high-temporal density
of measurement (e.g., using repeated measures of social contexts in
a social network).
Another type of prediction of our model concerns what is
learned from past social contexts. Our model is very specific with
respect to what it learns, as described above. The predictions in
this regard are equally specific–learning a belief structure will
capture the higher-order correlations among a set of beliefs. This is
a testable prediction, given that we know what the past social
context was. It might be a fruitful area of research in the health
behavior field to explore the belief structure–not just what beliefs
are salient but the strength of the relations among beliefs–because
this may be a strong driver of the dynamics of intention.
Finally, a general set of predictions come from the attitude
formation literature. Our model puts the TRA on an equal footing
with recent advances in attitude formation, and thus, offers a set of
predictions related to the extant theoretic controversies. For
example, the debates over implicit/explicit change [38], and
constructivist/static memory representations [23] come with
empirical predictions. These, we think, might find a way into
the TRA as extended by us.
Summary
In sum, our model advances the Theory of Reasoned Action in
meaningful ways that make testable predictions. First, it explicitly
models the development of a belief structure via learning from past
experience with others’ beliefs. Second, direct social influence–the
effect of others’ beliefs in the immediate social context–is captured
in the external constraints and is incorporated seamlessly with past
experience via constraint satisfaction. Third, intention is concep-
tualized as arising from a parsimonious and dynamic process
among belief valence banks and is predictive of empirical intention
measurements. Furthermore, by instantiating our theory in a
computational framework, we have opened the doors to multi-
agent models of population health that are based on plausible
psychological processes.
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